



Work Values, Work Rewards, and Work Orientations: A Comparison among Korea, Japan, the United States, and Sweden*

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The research reported in this paper provides a cross-cultural explanation on the multiplicative interrelationships among work values, work rewards, and work orientations that have long been discussed in the literature. Most of the previous studies, it is argued, are plagued with inconsistent and often conflicting research findings due mostly to the specificity of their samples to a certain group of workers in a certain society. In an attempt to recover this limitation, the ISSP work orientations module survey data are utilized in providing answers to a series of questions set forth about the relationships among the three variables in Korea, Japan, the U.S., and Sweden. Analysis of data indicates several salient findings: Asian workers in general are less positively oriented to their work than their counterparts in the West; extrinsic rewards are particularly important determinants of work orientations in Korea, whereas intrinsic rewards are more so in the West; Korean workers experience the largest amount of disparities between the valuation and actual provision of work rewards; a substantial amount of interactions upon work orientations exist between the valuation and provision of work rewards throughout the four countries. Implications stemming the findings are discussed and interpreted with suggesting some contextual explanations.

Keywords: work values, work rewards, work orientations, cross-national comparison, ISSP, value contingency argument

Employee orientations to work, which encompass the two essential concepts of job satisfaction and organizational commitment, have long been a topic of considerable managerial and scholarly interests. In effect, thousands of studies have been reported about the topic during the last couple decades (Hom and Griffeth 1995). This interest basically reflects the concern of

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employers and organizational scholars alike to enhance organizational effectiveness (Mowday et al. 1982), since work orientations are known to be intimately related to a variety of crucial outcomes such as employment stability, labor turnover, employee performance, and productivity.

Work orientations, however, are frequently plagued with inconsistent and conflicting research findings. A series of meta-analyses (Hom and Griffeth 1990), for instance, suggest that work orientations are, in effect, one of the most serious areas of study in which a plethora of inconsistent and often conflicting findings have continued to flourish over time. Several factors might be responsible for this diagnosis and one of the most important factors would probably be a failure to seek cross-cultural explanations by using standardized measures for different groups of workers in different societies. Apparently, this failure has made the extant studies become specific to a certain sample of workers in a certain society, thereby diminishing their generalizability to a considerable extent. The failure or shortcoming, it should be emphasized, can be best overcome with the introduction of cross-cultural research designs that rely on standardized measures and full probability sampling procedures for diverse categories of workers in diverse workplaces across diverse societies. In an effort to achieve this goal, the ISSP (International Social Survey Programme) had work orientations as its designated modular topic for the year of 1997 and produced immense data sets that use identical designs in measurement, sampling, and data collection across different countries all around the world. The data can thus serve as an invaluable source of prescription to overcome the sample-specific and culture-specific findings, which in turn helps to soothe the controversy concerning the findings on work orientations.

The current study attempts a cross-cultural explanation of employee work orientations by using the ISSP data for the four countries of Korea, Japan, the United States, and Sweden. Among several aspects of work characteristics, the focus of this study is on work values and work rewards as they relate to work orientations in these countries. As indicated in the conceptual discussion below, work rewards refer to a set of compensations or inducements the employing organization provides to the employees as a return to their services or contributions in the workplace, while work values refer to the extent to which employees value such rewards. Four of the most salient aspects of the provision and valuation of such rewards, which are completely parallel in their measurements, are of interest in this study: pay, promotion, job security, and job autonomy.

To be more precise, this study attempts to find an answer to a set of interrelated research questions concerning the complex relationships among work values, work rewards, and work orientations. The first question concerns a simple descriptive and univariate analysis of work orientations, work values, and work rewards: how different are the levels of work orientations, values, and rewards, respectively, across the countries? The second question is about the bivariate analysis concerning the discrepancy between the valuation and actual provision of

work rewards: how different are the discrepancies across the countries and what are the correlates of such discrepancies? The third question concerns a multivariate analysis of the predictors of work orientations and includes two sub-questions: (1) what factors are responsible for the variations in employee work orientations in each country and how different are the predictors across the countries; (2) are there any interactions between work values and work rewards in affecting work orientations in each country, and, if any, how different are the interacting patterns across the countries? As such, the former sub-question concerns the additive impacts of work rewards on work orientations, whereas the latter concerns the interactive impacts of work values and work rewards upon work orientations. Taken together, the first two questions are rather exploratory in nature and the third question is more explanatory. To say that the first two questions are exploratory, however, does not necessarily mean that they are unimportant. On the contrary, univariate and bivariate analyses could provide very fruitful insights into some 'facts' from a comparative perspective. This means that, instead of formulating any formal hypotheses about the first two questions, this study will satisfy itself with uncovering facts underlying the phenomena across the countries. Formulation and test of hypotheses will be done mostly for the third question that has stronger theoretical underpinnings.

A note is in order with respect to the selection of the four countries for comparison among tens of the ISSP-participating countries. As a matter of fact, this decision reflects a few deliberate considerations and, as such, they need to be discussed in a greater detail here because it helps to illuminate on the projected differences among the countries in the research questions proposed in this study.

Of major interest in this study is to figure out the way the cultural differences between the Eastern and Western societies shape the complex interrelationships among work values, work rewards, and work orientations. To compare the cultural orientations that relate to employment relationships in the workplace, it is frequently pointed out that the East is characterized by collectivistic and hierarchical orientations with the West being characterized by individualistic and lateral orientations (Kim 1999). To reiterate: the extent to which the group is more significant than the individual in work settings has traditionally been more salient in the East (Hofstede 1980). Unlike the Western organizations in which an individual's rights and responsibilities are respected over those of the group to which the individual belongs, work organizations in the East highly value mutual obligations and responsibilities as the most critical virtues. In these group-conscious societies, the principal actor is not so much the individual as the group or network in which the individual is embedded. Cohorts are hired, rewarded, and promoted typically on a group basis, and differences in individual performances, if any, are unlikely to be salient until relatively late in their careers. Aside from the collectivity, seniority has traditionally been more highly valued and rewarded in Asian societies than the individual merit or achievement (Steinberg 1989). A substantial number of work organizations

in Asian societies are thus hierarchically structured in terms of seniority rules to a greater or lesser extent,¹ and a lot of rewards and benefits are accrued to senior positions.

In short, workers in Asian societies tend to accept and value, up front, two of these cultural characteristics, to a greater extent than the workers in the West, as underlying principles regarding work in general. This characterization, even if somewhat sketchy, is sufficient to foretell that Korean and Japanese workers might probably be different from the U.S. and Swedish workers in terms of the multiplicative associations among work values, rewards, and orientations. Although it is not easy to predict the detailed pattern of differences resulting from this characterization, a case can still be made to suggest that extant explanations are likely to be culture-bound and may thus be unable to properly account for the variations across the countries. A cross-comparison effort attempted in this study is believed to provide valuable insights into the validity of existing studies for one thing and the uniqueness, if any, of Eastern societies for another.

In addition to the cultural differences, the comparison among the four countries reflects two minor considerations. On the one hand, the comparison is intended to figure out the impact of the variety of socio-political system on work values, rewards, and orientations. As is well known, Sweden has a system of social democracy, while the rest countries have a capitalist democratic system. Although the limited knowledge prevents a firmer hypothesizing about the impact, a case might be made to indicate that the social system would bring about some unique patterns of associations among the variables of interest. At the minimum, it can be suggested that the strong corporatist element prevalent in Swedish workplaces is likely to lower an overall commitment of the employees to their employing organizations, which in turn have

¹ It should be noted that there exist some controversies (Bae and Form 1986; Jung 2002) surrounding the characterization of employment practices in Eastern societies, typically Korea and Japan, as 'seniority-oriented.' Lee (1982), for instance, has once argued that employment practices in Korea are more merit-oriented than seniority-oriented on account of two observations: (1) the lifetime employment system is not firmly established; (2) the so-called 'lateral hiring' practices which do not discriminate against the mid-careers or experienced job applicants are prevalent. On a continuum, the Japanese lifetime employment *Nenko* system might ideally be located at one pole of the continuum, with the merit or market system, mostly found in Western organizations, located at the other pole (Dore 1973; Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990). Although employment practices in Korea and Japan are certainly located somewhere in between these two poles, they appear to be closer to seniority system than to merit system for the following reason. Pay schemes in a substantial portion of work organizations in Korea and Japan are still based on firm tenure and age than on performance or achievement (Eom 2006). Several different kinds of payment, fringe benefits, and allowances (e.g., those provided for extra work, family, firm tenure, firm position, retirement, work-time meals, commuting, etc.) are often offered in terms of seniority, and promotions are accrued accordingly, often irrespective to an employee's performance. Even if performance evaluation results also matter in deciding such crucial organizational rewards as pay and promotion, they do not become a major criterion in such decisions, tend to be informal and personalistic in nature, and are often focused on the group to which an employee belongs instead of on the individual employee itself. Sometimes, tenure and age are crucially considered in evaluating employee performances. In short, the extent to which performance evaluation works as a decisive factor with substantial importance is weaker for Korea and Japan than is the case for, say the U.S. and Sweden, and, for this reason, employment practices in the former countries might be better characterized as closer to seniority than merit system. It should be admitted, however, that employment practices in Korea are in the process of constant change lately, especially after the economic crisis in 1997, more toward the meritocracy.

some ramifications to other variables of interest. On the other hand, the comparison among the four countries can provide some clue as to the impact of economic development, too. In particular, a comparison may be made between Korea and the rest three countries, since Korea is the least developed country among the four. Again, this difference is likely to bring about some uniqueness in the variables under consideration.²

THEORETICAL DISCUSSION

The general theoretical framework running through the suggested research questions is the expectancy theory (Lawler 1973; Porter and Lawler 1968; Vroom 1964). Basic to the theory is the idea that employee affective responses to work (i.e., job satisfaction and organizational commitment) are a multiplicative function of two components, expectancy and valence. Expectancy is employees' subjective estimation about what characterizes the work organization, while valence is the amount of their subjective conceptions of preferred courses of action. As a field of motivation theory, the expectancy theory draws heavily on the exchange theory in Sociology of Work that tries to conceptualize the employer-employee linkage in terms of contributions and inducements (March and Simon 1958). Underlying the exchange theory in general and expectancy theory in particular is the argument that individual employees bring a set of pre-established expectancy (or expectation) and valence (or value) to the workplace, and, depending on the subsequent cognitive assessment of several workplace conditions, they are differently oriented to their work (i.e., jobs and the employing organizations) with varying degrees. This is tantamount to saying that, in the complex relationships between individual contributions and organizational inducements, employees maintain positive affective orientations to work insofar as the amount of organizational inducements at least matches or exceeds that of individual contributions (Gould 1979). Implicit in this argument is not merely the assumption that an individual employee, as a rational actor, constantly pursues the best possible optimization of his/her utilities, but also the assumption that the norm of reciprocity governs the relationship between the two parties (Etzioni 1988).

Given that one of the recurrent criticisms directed against the exchange theory centers on the alleged argument that an overemphasis on utilitarian considerations has led it to lose sight of the non-exchange or non-calculative aspects of workplace conditions (Argyris 1964; Kornhauser 1965), the expectancy theory confronts this criticism by explicitly incorporating

² One of the reviewers of this paper recommended that the variety of capitalism, rather than socio-political system, would be more appropriate for classifying the countries. In fact, the reviewer wanted to call the four countries, respectively, 'liberal market economy (U.S.),' 'coordinated market economy (Sweden),' 'Asian market economy (Japan),' and 'Asian developing economy (Korea).' Although the author does not disagree with the reviewer, a full-fledged adoption of the notion of capitalism is not done in this paper due mostly to the fact that the major focus is on the more loosely defined concept of socio-political system and economic development.

the non-calculative or intrinsic, as well as calculative or extrinsic, conditions of workplace as key antecedents of employee work orientations. As a matter of fact, the expectancy theory proposes an even broader conceptualization of organizational inducements by trying to tap all sorts of valued resources dispensed by the organization, whether they are extrinsic (e.g., pay, promotion) or intrinsic (e.g., job autonomy, workplace justice), with the general notion of 'work rewards.' Note that the employer or employing organization can use all sorts of valued resources at its disposal as inducements. Viewed in this way, positive orientations to work, which are usually typified by high levels of job satisfaction and organizational commitment, are regarded as the most representative manifestations of individual contributions to his/her employer as a return for the compensations or inducements dispensed by the organization.

What characterizes the expectancy theory is not so much the conceptualization of work values, rewards, and orientations themselves as the postulation of value contingencies. In fact, the expectancy theory is quite distinct in hypothesizing that work rewards do not invariably influence work orientations. Instead, the impacts of each work reward are suggested to vary over the levels of the third factor, the extent to which an employee places value in corresponding reward (Kalleberg 1977; Mottaz 1985, 1988; Mowday et al. 1982; Steers and Mowday 1981). According to Kalleberg (1977), to illustrate, variations in work orientations are produced, not merely because each employee evaluates seemingly similar work rewards differently, but because s/he values different rewards in the workplace. This is in line with Mobley's (1982) argument that the intensity of what employees value in work settings is highly variable. Some employees, for instance, place more value in autonomy, whereas others place more value in pay. In this situation, autonomy may or may not foster work orientations depending on how much an employee values the autonomous work environment. In a similar vein, a good paying job may not foster work orientations unless the employee values good pay. To use the statistical terminologies, the expectancy theory is, in effect, suggesting moderating or interactive, as well as additive, effects between work values and work rewards upon work orientations. The suggested interactions are ordinarily called the 'value contingency argument.'

It should be pointed out, however, that the value contingency argument has been ill balanced between theory and reality, primarily because there virtually have been sheer theoretical predictions at the expense of rigorous empirical assessments. Instead of explicitly measuring the levels of work values, most studies tended to simply assume that employees would highly value all sorts of work rewards with similar degrees. As a consequence, the argument has been seldom evaluated stringently in empirical studies so far and nothing much is known about the extent to which it is really true. The problem might be even more acute when one recalls the fact that the empirical studies, if any, were specific to some types of workers in a certain society, and that almost no known studies tried to test the argument by using complete parallel measures for work rewards and work values. The research questions set forth above in this study address, either directly or indirectly, the value contingency argument by relying on

the parallel and standardized measures for one thing and testing for representative national samples of workers across different societies for another.

METHODOLOGY

Sample and Data Collection

The suggested research questions, as indicated above, are addressed by utilizing the ISSP data sets. It is one of the crucial requirements of the ISSP that member countries conduct national sample surveys drawn from full probability sampling procedures. A more convenient quota sampling at any stages of sampling is discouraged due mostly to its vulnerability to a variety of misuses and abuses that are likely to result in serious sampling errors. The target universe in the ISSP surveys is normally the adult population aged 18 or over who live in households of each country.

The ISSP 97 Work Orientations module survey was conducted all at once in a total of 26 countries some time between 1997 and 1998. It should be noted, however, that Korean data were collected later in 2003 since Korea could join the ISSP only in that year. Although it is not required at all for any member institution to implement the forgone module surveys, the Survey Research Center that is in charge of the ISSP and KGSS (Korean General Social Survey) in Korea volunteered to catch up the surveys in order to promote comparative studies that include Korea. Data in the ISSP countries, including Korea, are usually collected by interviews, mostly face-to-face, with the respondents. While there are some countries (e.g., Japan) in which the module survey is conducted in its own right, most countries tend to incorporate the module into another wider survey framework, such as KGSS (Korea) or GSS (U.S.). As indicated above, the focus in this study is only on the four countries of Korea, Japan, the U.S., and Sweden.

Despite these common aspects of sampling and data collection, there exist some country-specific variations, however, in fieldwork operations and response rates. While Korea, Japan, and the U.S. employed the in-depth interviews for Work Orientations module survey, Sweden did the postal survey primarily (85%), coupled with the telephone interview follow-ups for the remaining non-respondents (15%). Valid overall response rates in each country are: Korea = 65.8% (1,315 / 2,000); Japan = 68.1% (1,226 / 1,800); U.S. = 75.6% (1,228 / 1,624); Sweden = 63.8% (1,276 / 1,999). Among these valid responses, the numbers of wage workers were: Korea = 473 (36.0%); Japan = 481 (39.2%); U.S. = 704 (57.3%); Sweden = 705 (55.3%). Now that the notion of work orientations in general and that of organizational commitment in particular applies only to wage (not including self-employed) workers, this group of workers becomes the focus of analysis in this study. A listwise deletion of missing cases for the variables analyzed in this study has reduced the final sample sizes in each country to 426

(Korea), 407 (Japan), 616 (U.S.), and 570 (Sweden).

Measurement and Analysis

Since the ISSP members are asked to administer identical module questionnaires across the countries, it is not surprising to see that the measures are exactly same across the four countries. Since the measurements tend to be rather simple and straightforward, there is no much need to reiterate them. Suffice it to say, however, that one of the work orientations of organizational commitment was operationalized by adapting the OCQ scale developed by Porter and his colleagues (Porter et al. 1974). It is also needed to indicate that each of the four aspects of the valuation and provision of work rewards (pay, promotion, job security, and job autonomy), as previously noted, has been tapped by using the completely parallel measures. Further details on the measures for the variables are provided in Table 1.

Several different estimation techniques were used to analyze the data in this study. With respect to the first research question, mean levels of work values, rewards, and orientations, respectively, were compared across the four countries and a series of ANOVA were conducted to test for the mean differences. In order to answer the second question, deviation scores were obtained for the differences between the valuation and provision of each work reward, and these deviation scores were subject to the ANOVA across the countries for one thing and the correlation analysis within each country for another. The third question was answered by means of an OLS regression analysis. In particular, whenever any significant interactions were observed, the patterns of interactions were further identified by decomposing the levels of values into two parts (i.e., low and high) and subsequently comparing the impacts of reward provision on work orientations between the two. A more powerful technique of structural equation modeling was not attempted due to the non-availability of measurement properties for the constructs (see Table 1).

RESULTS

Work Values, Work Rewards, and Work Orientations: A Univariate Analysis

The first question in this study concerns a cross-national comparison of the levels of each of the work values, work rewards, and work orientations. Table 1 contains relevant information.

With respect to the levels of work orientations, to begin with, job satisfaction is highest in the U.S. (5.273), followed by Sweden (5.189), Japan (4.764), and Korea (4.636). Overall, this difference in mean levels of job satisfaction across the countries is statistically significant ($F = 37.874, p < .000$). A subsequent post-hoc comparison in terms of Scheffe test indicates that major sources of the difference come from the disparities in Korea - U.S., Korea - Sweden, Japan - U.S., and Japan - Sweden. This means that the two Asian societies combined together

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Variables

Variables	Valid N	Mean	F Ratio	KR	JP	US	SW	Std. Dev.	Min - Max	Cronbach α
<u>Work Orientations</u>										
Job Satisfaction										
Korea	426	4.636		—	—	—	—	1.059	1 - 7 ^a	—
Japan	407	4.764	37.874	n.s.	—	—	—	1.157	1 - 7 ^a	—
U.S.	616	5.273	(<i>p</i> < .000)	*	*	—	—	1.255	1 - 7 ^a	—
Sweden	570	5.189		*	*	n.s.	—	1.013	1 - 7 ^a	—
Organizational Commitment										
Korea	426	3.576		—	—	—	—	.786	1 - 5 ^b	.7151
Japan	407	3.575	28.738	n.s.	—	—	—	.983	1 - 5 ^b	.6670
U.S.	616	3.878	(<i>p</i> < .000)	*	*	—	—	.702	1 - 5 ^b	.6766
Sweden	570	3.463		n.s.	n.s.	*	—	.791	1 - 5 ^b	.6701
<u>Work Values</u>										
Value in Pay										
Korea	426	4.472		—	—	—	—	.622	1 - 5 ^b	—
Japan	407	3.948	73.696	*	—	—	—	.766	1 - 5 ^b	—
U.S.	616	4.000	(<i>p</i> < .000)	*	n.s.	—	—	.733	1 - 5 ^b	—
Sweden	570	3.818		*	*	*	—	.713	1 - 5 ^b	—
Value in Promotion										
Korea	426	3.988		—	—	—	—	.861	1 - 5 ^b	—
Japan	407	2.826	266.592	*	—	—	—	.916	1 - 5 ^b	—
U.S.	616	4.237	(<i>p</i> < .000)	*	*	—	—	.684	1 - 5 ^b	—
Sweden	570	3.421		*	*	*	—	.923	1 - 5 ^b	—
Value in Job Security										
Korea	426	4.634		—	—	—	—	.555	1 - 5 ^b	—
Japan	407	4.086	53.502	*	—	—	—	.845	1 - 5 ^b	—
U.S.	616	4.550	(<i>p</i> < .000)	n.s.	*	—	—	.599	1 - 5 ^b	—
Sweden	570	4.465		*	*	n.s.	—	.721	1 - 5 ^b	—
Value in Job Autonomy										
Korea	426	4.035		—	—	—	—	.860	1 - 5 ^b	—
Japan	407	3.086	162.014	*	—	—	—	.942	1 - 5 ^b	—
U.S.	616	4.058	(<i>p</i> < .000)	n.s.	*	—	—	.746	1 - 5 ^b	—
Sweden	570	4.149		n.s.	*	n.s.	—	.776	1 - 5 ^b	—
<u>Work Rewards</u>										
Pay										
Korea	426	2.735		—	—	—	—	.919	1 - 5 ^b	—
Japan	407	2.641	4.547	n.s.	—	—	—	1.178	1 - 5 ^b	—
U.S.	616	2.732	(<i>p</i> < .01)	n.s.	n.s.	—	—	1.005	1 - 5 ^b	—
Sweden	570	2.537		*	n.s.	*	—	1.009	1 - 5 ^b	—
Promotion										
Korea	426	2.329		—	—	—	—	1.047	1 - 5 ^b	—
Japan	407	2.172	46.697	n.s.	—	—	—	1.114	1 - 5 ^b	—
U.S.	616	2.885	(<i>p</i> < .000)	*	*	—	—	1.051	1 - 5 ^b	—
Sweden	570	2.649		*	*	*	—	.992	1 - 5 ^b	—
Job Security										
Korea	426	3.462		—	—	—	—	1.170	1 - 5 ^b	—
Japan	407	3.850	13.103	*	—	—	—	1.337	1 - 5 ^b	—
U.S.	616	3.771	(<i>p</i> < .000)	*	n.s.	—	—	1.009	1 - 5 ^b	—
Sweden	570	3.511		n.s.	*	*	—	1.110	1 - 5 ^b	—

Table 1. (Continued)

Variables	Valid N	Mean	F Ratio	KR	JP	US	SW	Std. Dev.	Min - Max	Cronbach α
Job Autonomy										
Korea	426	3.298		—	—	—	—	1.171	1 - 5 ^b	—
Japan	407	2.528	173.634	*	—	—	—	1.457	1 - 5 ^b	—
U.S.	616	3.891	(<i>p</i> < .000)	*	*	—	—	.930	1 - 5 ^b	—
Sweden	570	3.963		*	*	n.s.	—	.853	1 - 5 ^b	—
<u>Socio-Demographics</u>										
Gender										
Korea	426	.592	—	—	—	—	—	.492	0 - 1 ^c	—
Japan	407	.597	—	—	—	—	—	.491	0 - 1 ^c	—
U.S.	616	.429	—	—	—	—	—	.495	0 - 1 ^c	—
Sweden	570	.491	—	—	—	—	—	.500	0 - 1 ^c	—
Age										
Korea	426	37.477	—	—	—	—	—	10.360	19 - 76	—
Japan	407	41.963	—	—	—	—	—	12.890	19 - 94	—
U.S.	616	39.070	—	—	—	—	—	11.323	18 - 81	—
Sweden	570	42.481	—	—	—	—	—	11.158	20 - 70	—
Educational Attainment ^d										
Korea	426	13.716	—	—	—	—	—	2.958	3 - 20	—
Japan	407	12.988	—	—	—	—	—	2.472	6 - 21	—
U.S.	616	13.774	—	—	—	—	—	2.400	2 - 20	—
Sweden	570	12.412	—	—	—	—	—	3.505	1 - 30	—
Employment Status										
Korea	426	.845	—	—	—	—	—	.362	0 - 1 ^e	—
Japan	407	.902	—	—	—	—	—	.298	0 - 1 ^e	—
U.S.	616	.817	—	—	—	—	—	.387	0 - 1 ^e	—
Sweden	570	.770	—	—	—	—	—	.421	0 - 1 ^e	—
Union Membership										
Korea	426	.178	—	—	—	—	—	.383	0 - 1 ^f	—
Japan	407	.342	—	—	—	—	—	.475	0 - 1 ^f	—
U.S.	616	.102	—	—	—	—	—	.303	0 - 1 ^f	—
Sweden	570	.888	—	—	—	—	—	.316	0 - 1 ^f	—
Occupation										
Korea	426	2.502	—	—	—	—	—	1.159	1 - 4 ^g	—
Japan	407	2.319	—	—	—	—	—	1.042	1 - 4 ^g	—
U.S.	616	2.674	—	—	—	—	—	1.192	1 - 4 ^g	—
Sweden	570	2.600	—	—	—	—	—	1.135	1 - 4 ^g	—

Notes 1^a 1 = low; 7 = high.^b 1 = low; 5 = high.^c 0 = female; 1 = male.^d In years of schooling.^e 0 = part-time; 1 = full-time.^f 0 = non-member; 1 = member.^g 1 = production / mechnical; 2 = sales / service; 3 = clerical / semi-professional; 4 = managerial / professional.

show consistently lower levels of job satisfaction than the two Western societies combined together. As for the other work orientation of organizational commitment, similar pattern is observed: Korea (3.576) and Japan (3.575) show lower levels than the U.S. (3.878). Unlike the case for job satisfaction, however, organizational commitments in Korea and Japan are not lower than that of Sweden (3.463). In fact, commitment in Sweden is lowest among the countries, although it is closer to Korea and Japan than to the U.S. A post-hoc comparison shows that major sources of the difference for the overall difference ($F = 28.738, p < .000$) come from the difference between the U.S. and Korea-Japan-Sweden. This means that, compared to the U.S., the three countries altogether evince sharply lower levels of workplace commitment. In short, although Swedish workers tend to show less loyalty to their employers, workers in Asian societies in general are less positively oriented to their jobs and organizations than their counterparts in the West, especially the U.S.

Comparison of the levels of work values across the four countries indicates several interesting findings. First, valuation of pay is highest in Korea (4.472), followed by the U.S. (4.000), Japan (3.948), and Sweden (3.818) ($F = 73.696, p < .000$). Differences in the valuation of pay for all possible pairs of countries are significant with the only exception of Japan - U.S. Second, the valuation of promotion is highest in the U.S. (4.237), followed by Korea (3.988), Sweden (3.421), and Japan (2.826) ($F = 266.592, p < .000$). Apparently, country variation in the valuation of promotion is much more pronounced than that of the valuation of pay. As a result, differences in the valuation of promotion are significant for all pairs. Third, the ordering of the valuation of job security across the countries is Korea (4.636), the U.S. (4.550), Sweden (4.465), and Japan (4.086) ($F = 53.502, p < .000$). Especially noteworthy in this respect is the consistent difference between Japan and the rest three countries. Fourth, valuation of job autonomy across the countries has the following ordering: Sweden (4.149), the U.S. (4.058), Korea (4.035), Japan (3.086) ($F = 162.014, p < .000$). Once again, Japan has consistent differences with the rest countries in this respect. To summarize the noteworthy findings concerning the cross-national comparison of work values, it can be pointed out that Korean workers tend to be the highest in placing values in pay, promotion, and job security, while Japanese workers tend to be the lowest in placing values in promotion, job security, and job autonomy. In addition, it may be indicated that Asian workers in general place more values in pay than Western workers, whereas Western workers in general place more values in job autonomy than Asian workers. In spite of these cross-national differences, however, one striking similarity overrides the four countries altogether: job security is regarded as the most important work reward throughout the countries.

Comparison of the levels of work reward provisions across the countries suggests several interesting findings, too. In terms of the provision of pay, first, no salient differences are observed, although the overall test across the countries is significant ($F = 4.547, p < .01$). One thing noteworthy, though, is the divergence of Sweden (2.537) from Korea (2.735) and Japan

(2.641). In terms of promotion, however, salient differences are observed: Korean (2.329) and Japanese (2.172) workers altogether enjoy consistently less promotions than their counterparts in the U.S. (2.885) and Sweden (2.649) ($F = 46.697, p < .000$). As for job security, salient differences are again observed: Korean (3.462) and Swedish (3.511) workers entertain less security than their counterparts in Japan (3.850) and the U.S. (3.771) ($F = 13.103, p < .000$). Particularly noteworthy in this regard is the lowest level of job security among Korean employees. With respect to job autonomy, finally, salient differences are identified once again: Korean (3.298) and Japanese (2.528) workers altogether have far less autonomy than the workers in the U.S. (3.891) and Sweden (3.963) ($F = 173.643, p < .000$). In sum, it may be said that, compared to Western workers, Asian workers tend to enjoy less amount of promotions and job autonomy, and that Korean workers have the least job security among the four countries.

Discrepancy between Valuation and Provision of Work Rewards: Uni- and Bi-Variate Analyses

The second question concerns the cross-national comparison of the deviations between the valuation and provision of each work reward. Two different sorts of analyses were conducted for this question: a univariate analysis of mean deviations across the countries and a bivariate correlation analysis for deviation scores and their correlates.

The result of the first analysis is presented in Table 2. With respect to the first reward of pay, the deviation is highest in Korea (1.737), followed by Japan (1.307), Sweden (1.281), and the U.S. (1.268) ($F = 15.118, p < .000$). The second reward of promotion shows a similar pattern: Korea (1.660) has the highest deviation, followed by the U.S. (1.352), Sweden (.772), and Japan (.654) ($F = 71.554, p < .000$). The third reward of job security again shows a similar pattern: Korea (1.171), Sweden (.954), the U.S. (.779), and Japan (.236) ($F = 38.825, p < .000$). The final reward of job autonomy once again shows a similar pattern: Korea (.737), Japan (.558), Sweden (.186), and the U.S. (.167) ($F = 27.115, p < .000$). Taken together, it may be indicated that, compared to the employees in other countries, Korean employees consistently experience the sharpest discrepancies between their valuation and provision of all types of work rewards. In addition, it may be indicated that, regardless of the countries, the extent to which the valuation diverges from the actual provision is most pronounced, in sequence, for pay (cross-national average = 1.398), promotion (average = 1.110), job security (average = .785), and job autonomy (average = .412).

The result of the correlation analysis is shown in Table 3. For this analysis, the deviation scores obtained in the previous analysis for each work reward were correlated with each of the work orientation and socio-demographic variables. As can be seen in the table, the deviation scores in general have significant negative correlations, quite consistently, with both types of work orientations across all countries, which implies that the more employees experience the

Table 2. Deviation Scores^a between Work Values and Work Rewards

Variables	Valid N	Average Deviation	F Ratio	KR	JP	US	SW	Std. Dev.	Min - Max
Pay: [Value] - [Reward]									
Korea	426	1.737		—	—	—	—	1.124	-1 - 4
Japan	407	1.307	15.118	*	—	—	—	1.397	-3 - 4
U.S.	616	1.268	(<i>p</i> < .000)	*	n.s.	—	—	1.195	-3 - 4
Sweden	570	1.281		*	n.s.	n.s.	—	1.254	-3 - 4
Promotion: [Value] - [Reward]									
Korea	426	1.660		—	—	—	—	1.266	-2 - 4
Japan	407	.654	71.554	*	—	—	—	1.216	-4 - 4
U.S.	616	1.352	(<i>p</i> < .000)	*	*	—	—	1.190	-3 - 4
Sweden	570	.772		*	n.s.	*	—	1.187	-3 - 4
Job Security: [Value] - [Reward]									
Korea	426	1.171		—	—	—	—	1.239	-2 - 4
Japan	407	.236	38.825	*	—	—	—	1.578	-4 - 4
U.S.	616	.779	(<i>p</i> < .000)	*	*	—	—	1.141	-3 - 4
Sweden	570	.954		n.s.	*	n.s.	—	1.347	-4 - 4
Job Autonomy: [Value] - [Reward]									
Korea	426	.737		—	—	—	—	1.267	-3 - 4
Japan	407	.558	27.115	n.s.	—	—	—	1.451	-4 - 4
U.S.	616	.167	(<i>p</i> < .000)	*	*	—	—	1.139	-3 - 4
Sweden	570	.186		*	*	n.s.	—	.982	-3 - 4

Note 1^a Actual, not absolute, deviations.

disparities between the valuation and provision of work rewards, the more they become negatively oriented to their jobs and employing organizations in all countries. Since the correlations between the deviation scores and socio-demographic variables are not quite consistent either across the reward types or across the countries, it is hard to discern any generalizable patterns. To brave a mistake of oversimplification, however, a few things may be identified: males in general experience less disparities than females; employees with higher educational attainment experience less disparities than those with lower education; full-time employees generally experience less disparities than part-time employees; union members in Sweden, if not other countries, experience lots of disparity as it relates to pay; production-mechanical employees experience more disparities than managerial-professional employees.

Predictors of Work Orientations: A Multivariate Analysis of Additive Impacts

The third question is concerned with the explanation of variations in work orientations within

Table 3. Correlations between Deviation Scores^a and Their Correlates

Correlates	Korea (N ₁ = 426)				Japan (N ₂ = 407)				U.S. (N ₃ = 616)				Sweden (N ₄ = 570)			
	Dev.1	Dev.2	Dev.3	Dev.4	Dev.1	Dev.2	Dev.3	Dev.4	Dev.1	Dev.2	Dev.3	Dev.4	Dev.1	Dev.2	Dev.3	Dev.4
<u>Work Orientations</u>																
Job Satisfaction	-.36‡	-.21‡	-.28‡	-.23‡	-.29‡	-.10	-.04	-.09	-.28‡	-.37‡	-.26‡	-.24‡	-.22‡	-.19‡	-.20‡	-.25‡
Organizational Commitment	-.28‡	-.18‡	-.20‡	-.18‡	-.19‡	-.14‡	-.02	-.00	-.28‡	-.27‡	-.16‡	-.19‡	-.27‡	-.15‡	-.23‡	-.27‡
<u>Socio-Demographics</u>																
Male	-.06	-.13†	.01	-.08	-.02	-.10	.05	.07	-.07	-.05	.03	.01	-.19‡	-.05	-.12†	-.05
Age	.04	.03	.02	.02	-.02	.14†	-.03	-.03	.00	.10†	.09	.03	-.09	.06	-.10†	.02
Years of Schooling	-.20‡	-.18‡	-.17‡	-.08	-.12†	-.09	-.16‡	.06	-.17‡	-.04	-.03	.00	-.09	-.02	-.15‡	.00
Full-Time	-.11	-.16‡	-.14†	-.05	-.09	-.18‡	-.03	.04	-.02	-.04	.07	-.00	-.13†	-.08	-.10	-.03
Union Member	-.04	-.01	-.08	.01	-.02	.02	.00	.08	.02	-.01	-.02	.06	.11†	.03	.07	.01
Production / Mechanical	.23‡	.10	.25‡	.07	.10	.13†	.07	.02	.13‡	.06	.08	.00	.04	.04	.03	.05
Sales / Service	.04	.05	-.02	.10	.08	-.01	-.07	-.03	.07	.04	.02	.09	.15‡	-.01	.10†	-.00
Clerical / Semi-Professional	-.12†	.03	-.09	-.03	-.02	-.02	.01	.01	-.03	-.01	-.03	-.02	.07	.07	.09	-.00
Managerial / Professional	-.14†	-.18‡	-.15‡	-.11	-.21‡	-.15†	-.04	-.01	-.14‡	-.07	-.06	-.05	-.25‡	-.10	-.21‡	-.05

Notes | ^a Dev. 1 = [Value in Pay] - [Pay Reward]; Dev. 2 = [Value in Promotion] - [Promotion Reward]; Dev. 3 = [Value in Job Security] - [Job Security Reward]; Dev. 4 = [Value in Job Autonomy] - [Job Autonomy Reward]. See Table 2 for further details.

† $p < .05$, one-tailed test. ‡ $p < .01$, one-tailed test. ++ $p < .001$, one-tailed test.

each country and across the countries, and contains two sub-questions, additive impacts and interactive impacts.

Before going through the results for these multivariate analyses, an introduction to the correlations among all variables included in the multivariate analyses is in order. This introduction is warranted, not only because it helps to figure out the zero-order correlations, but because it facilitates an examination of any symptoms of conceptual redundancies among the predictor variables that lead to multicollinearity. Table 4 shows that there exist several salient findings and these need to be addressed. First, the zero-order correlations between job satisfaction and organizational commitment vary across the countries: .52 ($p < .01$) (Korea); .37 ($p < .01$) (Japan); .49 ($p < .01$) (U.S.); .52 ($p < .01$) (Sweden). Of interest here is the particularly low correlation for Japan as compared to other countries. When partial correlations are calculated in order to figure out the associations between the two work orientations after adjusting for the effects of other variables (i.e., work values, work rewards, and socio-demographic variables), a similar pattern is observed, too: .40 ($p < .000$) (Korea); .29 ($p < .000$) (Japan); .34 ($p < .000$) (U.S.); .40 ($p < .000$) (Sweden) (Table 4). One minor change, however, occurs for the U.S.: the partial correlation shrinks a little bit more sharply in the U.S. than in other countries. Second, the correlations between each work value and work orientation are neither strong nor consistent. In other words, in all countries, only a few values have significant and modest amounts of correlations on the one hand, and some values are positively and others are negatively correlated with work orientations on the other hand. Especially noteworthy in this respect is the negative correlation of value in pay, although some are significant and others are not significant with work orientations across all countries. Third, unlike work values, work rewards have strong and consistent correlations with work orientations in all countries. This means that an ample provision of work rewards to the employees substantially enhances their affective orientations to work in general. Fourth, among the socio-demographic variables, only occupation has relatively strong and consistent correlations across the countries (besides the U.S.): production-mechanical workers are less positively oriented to their works, whereas managerial-professional workers are more positively oriented. It is worthwhile, as well, to see that union members maintain low commitment to their employers only in Sweden. Finally, an inspection of the amount of correlations among work rewards and socio-demographic variables indicates that no correlation is excessive, suggesting no severe symptoms of multicollinearity. To test for the collinearity problem more rigorously, the eigenvalue decomposition (see Gunst, 1983) was conducted, and the result has indicated that the smallest eigenvalue exceeds .05, a conventionally accepted criterion to determine the problem.

The result of estimating the additive impacts is available in Table 5. Note that socio-demographic variables are specified in the model mostly for control purposes. Focusing on Korea, to begin with, significant predictors of job satisfaction [M1] are pay ($b=.22$), job

Table 4. Zero-Order Correlations among the Variables^a

	Japan (N ₁ =407)																		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
Korea (N ₂ =426)																			
1. Job Satisfaction		.37 ^{†c}	-.16 [‡]	.06	.02	.00	.24 [‡]	.16 [‡]	.06	.09	.04	.18 [‡]	.07	.00	-.01	-.16 [‡]	.03	.02	.17 [‡]
2. Organizational Commitment	.52 ^{†b}		-.03	.13 [†]	.10	.01	.21 [‡]	.26 [‡]	.09	.01	.11	.07	.21 [‡]	.10	.09	-.20 [‡]	-.10	.12 [†]	.22 [‡]
3. Value in Pay	-.13	-.02		.28 [‡]	.41 [‡]	.11	.01	.05	-.01	.05	.04	-.06	-.10	.04	.03	.08	.02	-.08	-.01
4. Value in Promotion	-.02	.05	.41 [‡]		.21 [‡]	.20 [‡]	.07	.30 [‡]	.03	-.00	.17 [‡]	-.02	.08	.06	.13 [‡]	-.02	-.05	.01	.07
5. Value in Job Security	.03	.15 [†]	.32 [‡]	.24 [‡]		.12 [†]	.03	.05	.01	.04	.11	.08	-.10	.03	.08	.00	-.07	.01	.06
6. Value in Job Autonomy	.17 [‡]	.20 [‡]	.07	.18 [‡]	.19 [‡]		.07	-.02	.08	.33 [‡]	.07	.09	-.21 [‡]	.03	-.03	.19 [‡]	.05	-.19 [‡]	-.04
7. Pay	.36 [‡]	.33 [‡]	-.03	.07	.04	.03		.36 [‡]	.19 [‡]	.12	.05	-.02	.08	.13 [†]	.05	-.06	-.09	-.03	.24 [‡]
8. Promotion	.24 [‡]	.26 [‡]	.02	.13 [†]	-.02	.04	.52 [†]		.11	.02	.25 [‡]	-.17 [‡]	.17 [‡]	.25 [‡]	.09	-.16 [‡]	-.02	.03	.22 [‡]
9. Job Security	.31 [‡]	.28 [‡]	.00	.08	.11	-.00	.50 [‡]	.37 [‡]		.02	.01	.08	.12 [†]	.06	.05	-.08	.04	.00	.08
10. Job Autonomy	.37 [‡]	.34 [‡]	-.07	-.00	.04	.25 [‡]	.33 [‡]	.32 [‡]	.23 [‡]		-.03	.08	-.19 [‡]	-.02	-.10	.10	.06	-.13 [†]	-.01
11. Male	-.07	.04	-.05	.04	.01	.03	.05	.19 [‡]	-.00	.11		.10	.07	.28 [†]	.14 [†]	.18 [†]	-.26 [†]	-.13 [†]	.22 [†]
12. Age	-.02	.12 [†]	-.04	-.12 [†]	-.03	-.06	-.07	-.13 [†]	-.03	-.06	.22 [‡]		-.29 [†]	-.24 [†]	-.18 [†]	.10	-.03	-.17 [†]	.16 [†]
13. Years of Schooling	.10	.08	-.06	.08	-.04	.09	.21 [‡]	.28 [‡]	.16 [‡]	.15 [‡]	.07	-.30 [‡]		.14 [†]	.16 [†]	-.50 [†]	-.11	.40 [†]	.24 [†]
14. Full-Time	.05	.12 [†]	-.04	.03	.02	.01	.11	.22 [‡]	.16 [‡]	.06	.16 [‡]	-.05	.20 [‡]		.15 [†]	.03	-.20 [†]	.05	.09
15. Union Member	.02	-.03	.05	.05	.04	-.01	.09	.05	.10	-.02	.14 [†]	-.07	.04	.13 [†]		.02	-.17 [†]	.19 [†]	-.15 [†]
16. Production / Mechanical	-.12 [†]	-.11 [†]	.03	-.16 [‡]	.05	-.05	-.26 [‡]	-.26 [‡]	-.24 [‡]	-.11 [†]	.25 [‡]	.24 [‡]	-.47 [‡]	-.11	.06	-.28 [†]	-.60 [†]	-.24 [†]	
17. Sales / Service	.05	-.01	-.01	.04	-.06	.06	-.05	-.03	-.01	-.06	-.19 [‡]	-.06	-.15 [‡]	-.28 [‡]	-.13 [†]	-.24 [‡]	-.35 [†]	-.14 [†]	
18. Clerical / Semi-Professional	.04	.00	.01	.09	-.03	.01	.15 [‡]	.04	.08	.04	-.26 [‡]	-.28 [‡]	.20 [‡]	.10	.03	-.48 [‡]	-.26 [‡]	-.30 [†]	
19. Managerial / Professional	.05	.13 [†]	-.04	.05	.03	-.00	.15 [†]	.26 [‡]	.17 [‡]	.12 [†]	.17 [‡]	.10	.41 [‡]	.21 [‡]	.00	-.37 [‡]	-.20 [‡]	-.40 [‡]	

Notes | ^a The coefficients to the left off-diagonal refer to Korea, and those to the right off-diagonal refer to Japan.

^b Partial correlation between the two work orientations in Korea, which adjusts for work rewards and socio-demographic variables at the same time, is .4001 ($p < .000$).

^c Partial correlation between the two work orientations in Japan is .2927 ($p < .000$).

Table 4. (Continued)^d

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
Sweden (N ₄ =570)																			
U.S. (N ₃ =616)																			
1. Job Satisfaction		.52 ^{††}	-.04	.09	-.03	.09	.24 [‡]	.31 [‡]	.22 [‡]	.37 [‡]	-.03	.01	.00	.08	-.07	-.07	.02	-.04	.10
2. Organizational Commitment	.49 ^{††}		-.02	.19 [‡]	-.08	.09	.32 [‡]	.36 [‡]	.22 [‡]	.40 [‡]	.07	.03	.13 [‡]	.15 [‡]	-.11 [†]	-.15 [‡]	-.08	.03	.18 [‡]
3. Value in Pay	-.07	-.08		.34 [‡]	.15 [‡]	.14 [‡]	-.03	.02	.02	-.10 [†]	.06	-.11 [†]	.05	.14 [‡]	.10 [†]	.05	-.03	-.03	.00
4. Value in Promotion	-.03	.03	.43 [‡]		.03	.19 [‡]	.15 [‡]	.23 [‡]	.02	.08	.02	-.06	.20 [‡]	.07	-.02	-.13 [‡]	-.10 [†]	.04	.17 [‡]
5. Value in Job Security	.01	.15 [‡]	.27 [‡]	.34 [‡]		-.06	-.18 [‡]	-.13 [†]	-.04	-.12 [†]	-.11 [†]	.03	-.27 [‡]	-.05	.14 [‡]	.07	.14 [‡]	.07	-.26 [‡]
6. Value in Job Autonomy	.01	.02	.18 [‡]	.29 [‡]	.08		.16 [‡]	.10 [†]	.06	.28 [‡]	-.01	.08	.19 [‡]	.08	-.01	-.10	-.06	-.04	.19 [‡]
7. Pay	.28 [‡]	.27 [‡]	.08	-.04	-.03	-.04		.48 [‡]	.29 [‡]	.24 [‡]	.28 [‡]	.04	.15 [‡]	.26 [‡]	-.06	-.02	-.21 [‡]	-.11 [†]	.31 [‡]
8. Promotion	.39 [‡]	.33 [‡]	.04	.11 [†]	-.02	.04	.40 [‡]		.23 [‡]	.30 [‡]	.08	-.12 [†]	.20 [‡]	.17 [‡]	-.05	-.17 [‡]	-.08	-.04	.28 [‡]
9. Job Security	.30 [‡]	.27 [‡]	.02	-.09	.06	-.02	.30 [‡]	.30 [‡]		.16 [‡]	.07	.15 [‡]	.00	.08	.01	.01	-.03	-.06	.08
10. Job Autonomy	.31 [‡]	.25 [‡]	-.09	-.05	-.08	.09	.21 [‡]	.17 [‡]	.08		.05	.05	.17 [‡]	.11 [†]	-.02	-.15 [‡]	-.05	-.04	.23 [‡]
11. Male	-.09	-.05	.05	-.02	-.09	-.05	.12 [†]	.04	-.09	-.06		-.01	-.04	.40 [‡]	-.03	.30 [‡]	-.26 [‡]	-.12 [†]	.05
12. Age	.07	.06	-.07	-.15 [‡]	.09	.05	-.05	-.21 [‡]	-.05	-.00	-.03	.03	-.13 [‡]	-.03	.11 [†]	-.04	-.09	.04	.07
13. Years of Schooling	-.00	.02	-.11 [†]	-.01	-.06	.04	.13 [‡]	.04	.00	.03	-.02	.03	.07	.07	-.05	-.38 [‡]	-.07	-.04	.47 [‡]
14. Full-Time	-.06	.00	.11 [†]	.02	.11 [†]	-.01	.11 [†]	.06	-.01	-.01	.14 [‡]	.12 [†]	.10 [†]	.00	.11 [†]	-.22 [‡]	-.04	.12 [†]	
15. Union Member	-.01	.02	.04	-.02	.00	-.03	.00	.00	.02	-.10 [†]	.04	.12 [†]	-.00	.05	.01	-.01	.07	-.08	
16. Production / Mechanical	-.07	-.06	.13 [‡]	.04	.06	-.06	-.05	-.03	-.05	-.05	.33 [‡]	-.03	-.32 [‡]	.05	.05	-.26 [‡]	-.39 [‡]	-.35 [‡]	
17. Sales / Service	-.05	-.05	-.03	-.03	.01	-.01	-.10 [†]	-.06	-.02	-.12 [†]	-.04	-.07	-.15 [‡]	-.12 [†]	-.01	-.23 [‡]	-.30 [‡]	-.27 [‡]	
18. Clerical / Semi-Professional	.01	.00	-.04	.01	-.02	-.00	.00	.02	.02	.02	-.20 [‡]	-.00	-.02	-.03	-.04	-.38 [‡]	-.23 [‡]	-.41 [‡]	
19. Managerial / Professional	.09	.09	-.06	-.03	-.04	.06	.12 [†]	.06	.04	.11 [†]	-.09	.07	.43 [‡]	.07	.00	-.43 [‡]	-.26 [‡]	-.44 [‡]	

Notes | ^d The coefficients to the left off-diagonal refer to the U.S., and those to the right off-diagonal refer to Sweden.

^e Partial correlation between the two work orientations in the U.S. is .3352 ($p < .000$).

^f Partial correlation between the two work orientations in Sweden is .3952 ($p < .000$).

[†] $p < .05$, one-tailed test. [‡] $p < .01$, one-tailed test. ^{††} $p < .001$, one-tailed test.

security ($b = .13$), job autonomy ($b = .26$), and the status of male ($b = -.28$). And significant predictors of organizational commitment in Korea [M3] are pay ($b = .14$), job security ($b = .08$), job autonomy ($b = .17$), and age ($b = .01$). Taken together, the variables in the model account for 23.8% and 22.1% of the variances in job satisfaction and organizational commitment, respectively. As for Japan, next, three variables [M5] — pay ($b = .19$), age ($b = .02$), and the occupational categories of sales-service ($b = .41$), clerical-semiprofessional ($b = .30$), managerial-professional ($b = .46$) — have significant impacts on job satisfaction, and similar three variables [M7] — promotion ($b = .16$), age ($b = .01$), and the occupational categories of clerical-semiprofessional ($b = .28$) and managerial-professional ($b = .49$) — have significant impacts on organizational commitment. Explained variances in job satisfaction and organizational commitment are .138 and .164, respectively. Turning to the U.S., next, pay ($b = .10$), promotion ($b = .38$), job security ($b = .20$), job autonomy ($b = .29$), age ($b = .02$), and full-time ($b = -.30$) are significant predictors of job satisfaction [M9], while pay ($b = .08$), promotion ($b = .16$), job security ($b = .11$), job autonomy ($b = .13$), and age ($b = .01$) are significant predictors of organizational commitment [M11]. A total of 28.6% and 20.2% of the variances in each work orientation are accounted for by the variables specified in the model. With respect to Sweden, finally, the predictors of job satisfaction [M13] are pay ($b = .09$), promotion ($b = .17$), job security ($b = .11$), job autonomy ($b = .35$), male ($b = -.22$), and years of schooling ($b = -.03$), whereas those for organizational commitment [M15] are pay ($b = .09$), promotion ($b = .14$), job security ($b = .07$), job autonomy ($b = .26$), union member ($b = -.23$), and clerical/semiprofessional ($b = .20$). Explained variances in each work orientation at this time are 22.3% and 26.4%.

To compare the salient predictors across the countries, several things may be noted. First, most important predictors of work orientations tend to be somewhat inconsistent across the countries: while job autonomy and promotion are two of the most important predictors in the U.S. and Sweden alike, pay and job autonomy are so in Korea, with pay and promotion being so in Japan. To brave an oversimplification, it appears that the extent to which pay operates as the determinant of employee orientations to work is stronger for the Asian societies, and that the extent to which job autonomy does so is stronger for the Western societies. Second, the predictors of job satisfaction and organizational commitment, respectively, do not tend to be incongruent across the countries. As shown in the table, the predictors for the two constructs, albeit some differences in some countries, generally match with each other. Third, the explanatory powers (adjusted R^2) of the predictor variables specified in the identical model for all countries do vary to some extent across the countries: .216 and .198 (Korea); .111 and .139 (Japan); .272 and .186 (U.S.); .206 and .249 (Sweden). Apparently, the explanatory power is lowest in Japan, highest in the U.S. and Sweden, and middle in Korea. Finally, there exist a few socio-demographic predictors unique to a certain country. Especially interesting in this respect is impacts of gender in Korea and Sweden, occupation in Japan, and union membership

Table 5. OLS Estimates for Models on Work Orientations in Korea, Japan, U.S., and Sweden^a

Predictor Variables	Korea (N ₁ =426)				Japan (N ₂ =407)				U.S. (N ₃ =616)				Sweden (N ₄ =570)			
	Job Satisfaction		Organizational Commitment		Job Satisfaction		Organizational Commitment		Job Satisfaction		Organizational Commitment		Job Satisfaction		Organizational Commitment	
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12	M13	M14	M15	M16
<u>Work Rewards</u>																
Pay	.22 ⁺⁺	.52 ⁺⁺	.14 [‡]	.30 [‡]	.19 ⁺⁺	.57 ⁺⁺	.08	.15	.10 [†]	.29 [†]	.08 [‡]	.28 ⁺⁺	.09 [†]	.11	.09 [‡]	.09
Promotion	.02	-.07	.04	-.04	.09	.00	.16 ⁺⁺	.14	.38 ⁺⁺	.31 [†]	.16 ⁺⁺	.01	.17 ⁺⁺	.14	.14 ⁺⁺	.01
Job Security	.13 [‡]	.09	.08 [†]	-.21 [†]	-.02	-.11	.00	-.08	.20 ⁺⁺	.14	.11 ⁺⁺	-.11	.11 [‡]	.08	.07 [‡]	.04
Job Autonomy	.26 ⁺⁺	.05	.17 [‡]	.05	.06	.09	.02	-.09	.29 ⁺⁺	.32 ⁺⁺	.13 ⁺⁺	.17 ⁺⁺	.35 ⁺⁺	.35 ⁺⁺	.26 ⁺⁺	.35 ⁺⁺
<u>Work Rewards * Values</u>																
Pay * Value	—	-.07 [†]	—	-.03	—	-.09 ⁺⁺	—	-.02	—	-.04	—	-.05 [‡]	—	-.00	—	.00
Promotion * Value	—	.03	—	.02	—	.03	—	.01	—	.02	—	.03 [†]	—	.01	—	.03 [†]
Job Security * Value	—	.01	—	.06 [‡]	—	.02	—	.02	—	.01	—	.05 ⁺⁺	—	.01	—	.01
Job Autonomy * Value	—	.04 [‡]	—	.02 ⁺⁺	—	-.01	—	.03	—	-.01	—	-.01	—	.00	—	-.02
<u>Socio-Demographics</u>																
Male	-.28 [‡]	-.29 [‡]	-.09	-.10	.01	.01	-.00	-.03	-.17	-.16	-.05	-.02	-.22 [†]	-.21 [†]	-.01	-.01
Age	.01	.01	.01 ⁺⁺	.01	.02 ⁺⁺	.02 ⁺⁺	.01 [‡]	.01 [‡]	.02 ⁺⁺	.02 ⁺⁺	.01 [‡]	.01 [‡]	-.00	-.00	.00	.00
Years of Schooling	.02	.02	.01	.01	.02	.02	.05	.05 [†]	-.02	-.03	-.01	-.01	-.03 [†]	-.03 [†]	-.00	-.00
Full-Time	.07	.04	.19	.17	.04	.08	.12	.10	-.30 [‡]	-.30 [†]	-.05	-.08	.10	.10	.11	.12
Union Member	.04	.05	-.09	-.09	.05	.04	.16	.14	.01	.01	.05	.05	-.18	-.18	-.23 [†]	-.24 [†]
Sales / Service ^b	.13	.07	.10	.08	.41 [†]	.41 [†]	.05	.05	.04	.03	.04	.04	.12	.12	.08	.09
Clerical / Semi-Professional ^b	-.15	-.16	-.02	-.02	.30 [†]	.26	.28 [†]	.29 [†]	.01	.00	.01	.02	-.01	-.01	.20 [†]	.19 [†]
Managerial / Professional ^b	-.19	-.19	.01	-.02	.46 [†]	.41	.49 [†]	.49 [†]	.12	.11	.07	.08	.01	.00	.12	.11
Constant	2.30 ⁺⁺	2.48 ⁺⁺	1.57 ⁺⁺	1.62 ⁺⁺	2.58 ⁺⁺	2.68 ⁺⁺	1.51 ⁺⁺	1.58 ⁺⁺	1.96 ⁺⁺	2.00 ⁺⁺	2.14 ⁺⁺	2.18 ⁺⁺	3.30 ⁺⁺	3.30 ⁺⁺	1.53 ⁺⁺	1.49 ⁺⁺
R ² (Adj. R ²)	.238	.260	.221	.255	.138	.165	.164	.175	.286	.290	.202	.237	.223	.223	.264	.277
	(.216)	(.231)	(.198)	(.226)	(.111)	(.131)	(.139)	(.141)	(.272)	(.271)	(.186)	(.217)	(.206)	(.201)	(.249)	(.256)

Notes | ^a Regression coefficients are unstandardized ones.
^b Omitted is Production / Mechanical employees.
[†] $p < .05$, one-tailed test. [‡] $p < .01$, one-tailed test. ⁺⁺ $p < .001$, one-tailed test.

in Sweden: males in Korea and Sweden are less satisfied with their jobs than their female counterparts; Japanese workers with a higher occupational prestige are more positively oriented to their jobs and organizations; Swedish union members are negatively oriented to their employing organizations.

Predictors of Work Orientations: A Multivariate Analysis of Moderating Impacts

Another sub-question associated with the explanation of variations in work orientations concerns the moderating impacts upon work orientations between the valuation and provision of work values. In order to test for such impacts, the additive models were expanded in a way to further include the interaction terms (i.e., valuation * provision) for each work reward, and the coefficients for the interaction terms were tested for their statistical significances. The result of this analysis is also provided in Table 5.

To begin with Korea, the interaction effects on job satisfaction [M2] as they relate to pay and job autonomy are significant. To further examine the patterns of significant interactions, the interaction about job autonomy ($b = .04$) is right in the predicted direction, which means that, controlling for the effects of other variables in the model, the extent to which job autonomy operates to enhance job satisfaction is higher for those employees who place more value in autonomy. The interaction about pay ($b = -.07$), however, is in the unanticipated direction, because the coefficient implies that the degree to which pay operates to enhance job satisfaction is higher for those employees who place less, not more, value in pay. Turning to organizational commitment [M4], the interaction effects are significant as they relate to job security ($b = .06$) and job autonomy ($b = .02$). Interaction patterns for these two are consistent with the prediction: the extent to which job security for one thing and job autonomy for another operate to foster commitment is more pronounced when employees place more values in such rewards. Taken together, the interaction terms additionally specified in the models [M2 and M4] increase the explained variances in job satisfaction and organizational commitment, respectively, by 2.2% ($p(\Delta, R^2) < .05$) and 3.5% ($p(\Delta, R^2) < .01$).

With respect to Japan, only one interaction effect is significant throughout: the interaction on job satisfaction [M6] as it relates to pay. Like the case in Korea, however, the pattern ($b = -.09$) is in the unanticipated direction again, implying that the extent to which pay increases job satisfaction is more pronounced when employees place less value in pay. The interaction terms in the models [M6 and M8] increase the explained variances in the two work orientations by 2.7% ($p(\Delta, R^2) < .05$) and 1.1% ($p(\Delta, R^2) > .05$), respectively.

As for the U.S., a total of three interactions are significant: the interactions on organizational commitment [M12] as they relate to pay ($b = -.05$), promotion ($b = .03$), and job security ($b = .05$). Once again, the interaction pattern for pay ($b = -.05$) is in the wrong direction with those for promotion and job security being in the predicted directions. The amounts of increment in R^2 's for each work orientation are .4% ($p(\Delta, R^2) > .05$) and 3.5% (p

$(\Delta, R^2) < .01$).

For Sweden, finally, only one interaction is significant: the effect on organizational commitment [M16] as it relates to promotion ($b = .03$). This effect is in the predicted direction, implying that the extent to which employee loyalty to the employer is enhanced by being promoted is more pronounced when s/he highly values promotion. Addition of interaction terms in the additive models increases the explained variance in organizational commitment by 1.3% ($p(\Delta, R^2) > .05$), while it does not increase the variance in job satisfaction at all.

To sum the results for interaction effect tests across the countries, three observations are available. First, as hypothesized in this study, there does exist a substantial amount of interactions across the countries. Second, the way the interactions occur is not always consistent across the types of work rewards, across the types of work orientations, and across the countries. Third, the provision of pay tends to have relatively consistent interactions with its valuation upon satisfaction or commitment throughout the countries, but it is interacting in the unexpected direction. This awaits for a further scrutiny and discussion later.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This study was prompted by the diagnosis that previous studies of work orientations suffer from inconsistent and conflicting research findings due mostly to the specificity of their samples to certain groups of employees in a certain society. As a result, most studies, it was argued, tended to provide explanations that are bound to some categories of workers, some types of organizations, or some types of countries. This problem was suggested to be resolved to a considerable extent by utilizing the ISSP work orientations module survey data that have been collected for diverse groups of workers in diverse workplaces across diverse countries. Thus, an attempt has been made to account for the complex interrelationships among work values, work rewards, and work orientations in Korea, Japan, the U.S., and Sweden.

Major findings from the extensive analysis thus far may be summarized like the followings. (1) Compared to Western workers, Asian workers tend to be less positively oriented to their jobs and organizations. (2) Korean workers tend to be the highest in placing values in such rewards as pay, promotion, and job security, while Japanese workers tend to be the lowest in placing values in promotion, job security, and job autonomy. (3) Asian workers in general place more values in pay than Western workers, whereas the latter generally place more values in job autonomy than Asian workers. (4) Throughout all countries, job security is by far the most important work reward. (5) Compared to Western workers, Asian workers tend to entertain less promotions and job autonomy. (6) Korean workers possess the least amount of job security among the four countries. (7) Korean workers consistently experience the largest amount of discrepancies between the valuation and actual provision of all types of work

rewards. (8) Regardless of the countries, the extent to which the valuation diverges from the provision is most pronounced for pay, followed by promotion, job security, and job autonomy. (9) In all countries, the more the workers experience disparities between the valuation and provision of work rewards, the more they become negatively oriented to their works. (10) The extent to which job satisfaction correlates with organizational commitment is the lowest for Japanese workers. (11) Although work values tend to be only weakly and inconsistently related with work orientations, work rewards have strong and consistent relationships with work orientations throughout the countries. (12) Controlling for the effects of other variables, the extent to which pay operates as a determinant of work orientations is stronger for Asian workers, while the extent to which job autonomy does so is stronger for Western workers. (13) The predictors of job satisfaction and organizational commitment tend to be similar across the countries. (14) There exists a substantial amount of interactions between the valuation and provision of work rewards throughout the countries. (15) Although the way such interactions occur is not uniform across the types of rewards, work orientations, and the countries, the provision of pay tends to show relatively consistent interactions with its valuation throughout the countries. Its interaction pattern, however, is not in the predicted direction.

It appears that several implications stem from the above findings. First, the finding that Asian workers are less positively oriented to their work than their counterparts in the West suggests a case to cast doubt on Lincoln and Kalleberg (1990). Ever since the seminal work of Lincoln and Kalleberg, it has been accepted as a kind of long-standing orthodox in Sociology of Work that Japanese (and, by extension, Asian) workers are far more strongly committed to their employers than American (and, by extension, Western) workers. Their work, however, has been constantly criticized, too, on account of the representativeness of the samples in Japan and the U.S. Nonetheless, nobody could persuasively challenge their argument, simply because evidence was not readily available. With firmer evidence that is grounded in national sample surveys in four countries, each representing the East and West, however, the current study suggests that their argument is likely to be a myth.

Second, the finding that the extent to which pay, promotion, and job security are highly valued is particularly pronounced in Korea, while the extent to which job autonomy is highly valued is pronounced in the West, appears to support the argument that extrinsic rewards are more important to the workers in a developing country with intrinsic rewards being so to those in the more developed countries. When this finding is combined together with another finding concerning the particular importance of pay for Asian workers and the particular importance of job autonomy for Western workers in shaping their work orientations, the argument indicated above may look more compelling.

Third, the fact that Korean workers experience the largest amount of disparities between the valuation and provision of work rewards suggests that they are the very people who suffer most severely from the inconsistency between their expectations and realities in the workplace. As

emphasized previously, these disparities or inconsistencies are well likely to result in lowered affective orientations to work, and they might be responsible in part for the low levels of work orientations observed among Korean workers.

Fourth, the result concerning the existence of a substantial amount of interactions between the valuation and provision of work rewards throughout the four countries is evidence to support for the soundness of the expectancy theory. It has been one of the underlying arguments in this study that the impact of work rewards is not likely to be uniform but variant over the levels of work values, and, as such, the finding is in line with the value contingency argument. Given that the value contingency argument, as pointed out previously, has merely been implicitly assumed or has been tested, if any, with samples specific to a certain employees in a certain society at best, the finding in this study could work as evidence to solicit future researches to take work values into account in their explanations of employee work orientations. Obviously, this guidance is not unfounded, considering the extensive controls introduced in this study to the models in testing for the interaction effects.

Fifth, the finding concerning the interaction effects of pay in the unanticipated direction is at odd with the original expectation. This looks like an anomaly because, unlike the initial prediction, the effects turned out to be significant in the opposite direction across the three countries. Unfortunately, however, no solid explanation may be offered about this. To suggest a small possibility, however, the finding appears to be related to the negative association between pay valuation and work orientations. As seen in Table 4, value in pay, if not the provision of pay, is consistently negatively correlated with work orientations. With a negatively correlated item as one of its multiplication components, the interaction term is likely to lead to a negative impact on the dependent variable. This possibility should be interpreted with caution, however, because it is simply a statistical interpretation. Future studies are thus encouraged to pay more attention to uncover the substantive logic and rationale behind the finding.

Sixth, a note is in order with respect to a few contextual findings. As emphasized earlier, socio-cultural contexts unique to a society are likely to produce some findings unique to the society. As a matter of fact, this study has abstained from suggesting any strict hypothesizing about the contextual findings. This was due mostly to the limited state of knowledge about the matter. Even if this study was certainly exploratory in this respect, it could retrieve some salient contextual findings, nonetheless. Representative examples include: the lower levels of work orientations among Asian workers; importance of extrinsic rewards for the workers in the developing country as opposed to the importance of intrinsic rewards for those in the more developed countries; the lower level of employer loyalty among Swedish workers, especially union members; the lower level of job satisfaction among males in Korea and Sweden.³

³ The finding on gender is consistent with the latest result of Mueller and Kim (2008) that provides support for the

Although it is not clear why and in what manner these results are produced, they might serve as baseline facts waiting for further probes later.

Finally, this study, it should be emphasized, could provide several cross-cultural explanations about the multiplicative relationships among work values, work rewards, and work orientations that have long been discussed with no firm and consistent basis. This has been made possible by relying on the data set which is not confined to any specific groups of workers in a specific society. The virtue of this study, albeit its potential limitations and problems, might have to be sought in this respect.

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